



THEME 2: Intercultural Dialogue

Teaching and Learning Aids

Political, socio-economic and legal frameworks

The Troubled Nation-State – The Strains of Integration, Transformation and Immigration

by: *Edmund Ohlendorf*

When intercultural dialogue is set as the reference frame, consideration of the role played by the nation-state reveals a huge complexity of intertwining relationships at levels involving both active agents and the individuals affected by them.

We therefore begin by aiming to explain historical and political developments from a national, European and global perspective.

We follow this with specific illustrations of the effects these developments have had. Diagram Gp 202/1 (s. Collection of Materials, p. 7) sheds light on the complex fabric of intermeshing strands by itemising elements, policies and patterns of behaviour.

In a third step our attention turns more specifically to the impact on individuals and groups affected by particular forms of socio-economic and politico-cultural change. This angle is also visually reinforced by means of a table (s. Gp 202/2, Collection of Materials, p. 8).

A fourth section is dedicated to the repercussions that socio-economic transformation has on how majority and minority societies are correlated.

1. Point of Departure

1.1 The nation-state in relation to its people's expectations

Citizens – at least in the majority of European countries – expect their states to provide:

- The protection of life and limb, i.e. domestic and foreign security
- Social security in sickness and old age
- Legitimacy of rule
- Adequate educational provision
- Advantageous conditions for the securing of an economic livelihood
- Safeguards for the quality of life

States that manage to meet such demands prove so attractive to inhabitants of other countries in which provisions are not so generous that, in some instances, thousands every year risk their lives attempting to acquire access to such conditions.

In the past 20 years, however, nation-states have seen a number of factors contribute to a drop in standards of fulfilment of and/or failures in ability to fulfil their citizens' expectations. There has been a decline in the vigour with which nation-states pursue social integration and in the European states, almost without exception, attempts are increasingly underway to stem the tide of immigration from non-European countries. What has led to these changed circumstances?

1.2 Europeanisation, globalisation and demographic change

- In contrast to the massive obstruction of immigration from without, Europeanisation from within has produced greater freedom of movement and right of establishment.
- Fostered by the removal of the iron curtain in Europe and the end of the global east-west divide, national frontiers have lost significance in terms of the flow of information, capital and goods. (Further details relating to so-called globalisation are to be found in the material provided by Ute ACKERMANN-BOEROS on COMCULT Theme 3)
- Populations in western industrial countries are in decline while in the Third World they are on the rise. On the one hand this adds to immigration pressures for prosperous nations and on the other shifts the demand for goods to hitherto less developed regions.
- At the same time, medical advances are securing increased longevity within populations, rendering health care and old age pensions no longer affordable at previously customary levels.

1.3 The welfare state in a funding crisis

The welfare state in the course of its development in Europe since the end of the 19th century was empowered to compel companies and individuals to surrender part of their revenue through statutory requirements (interventionist state). Correspondingly administered, these funds were redirected into the social sector, consequently permitting increasing numbers of the population to enjoy a share in prosperity. This system operated effectively – with interruption during the two world wars – right up into the 1980s. At the very moment in time that the welfare state could in fact use more funding to maintain its standards, commercial enterprises (so-called global players) choose partial relocation of their means of production to lower-wage countries or developing markets. These firms create severe difficulties for many nation-states as they deprive governments of local investment and tax revenue, in many cases even causing redundancies that must be catered for in the ‘welfare safety nets’ provided by the nation-states. (LANGE, 2002, p. 121; LEIBFRIED/ZÜRN, 2006, p. 44f)

In most instances a reduction in social benefits is borne more heavily by the weaker sections of society. The resultant widening gap between rich and poor can have a destabilising effect in democratic systems when there is inadequate understanding or acceptance of the reasons behind the changes within their particular contexts. The fear of welfare dismantling was enough in itself to bring about rejection of the European Constitution in France in 2005, plunging the entire EU into political crisis.

The chief beneficiaries of globalisation are companies and asset owners, whereas poorly qualified members of the labour market are forced into reduced earnings or even suffer job loss because of cheap-wage competition. In these circumstances must leave be taken of the set goal so far, ‘full employment’? – a high percentage of ‘the marginalised’ accepted as an inevitability? – or are there ways leading forward and out of the dilemma?

(The accompanying Collection of Materials contains a catalogue of questions for use in the classroom and additional sources on the topic, Tp 202/1, Tp 202/2, Tp 202/3 , Tp 202/4)

1.4 Reform deadlock as a structural deficiency of federalist systems

The problems caused by globalisation as outlined above have been known to experts and politicians for more than 20 years now, yet in Germany in particular it has been possible, purely for reasons of political tactics, to exploit the system of federal decision-making to obstruct practically all reform. When the majority situation for the parties in the *Bundestag* differed from that in the *Bundesrat* (the Lower and Upper Houses respectively) – a state of affairs that repeatedly occurred in the last four parliament terms – the particular Opposition party in the Lower House (minority) availed itself of the opportunity in the Upper House (here with a majority) to block the passage of the majority of legislation. Owing to the necessity till 2006 for Upper House approval in respect of some two-thirds of all legislation, debate about urgently required reforms was indeed held but the actual reforms never managed to be carried out.

This structural deficiency in federalism can however also be seen to be a weakness of the European Union as a whole, with the proviso that it is not so much party political tactics that prevent rapid solutions as the particular self-interest displayed by the individual national governments.

Freedom of movement and the right of establishment within the EU also lead individuals from poorer states to migrate to those in which they can earn a better living and also enjoy higher state benefits. The poorer states see this as easing their burden, the wealthier states as a strain potentially curtailing what the state is in a position to provide. Competition based on undercutting wages leads on the one hand to calls for state curbs, yet on the other reduces the very chances of providing such protection.

The creation of a common European welfare policy is undoubtedly one of the knottiest future problems waiting to be tackled by the EU, the difficulties here compounded by the fact that its most important member states have themselves only just begun to adapt their welfare systems to the given circumstances. (Tp 202/5)

1.5 Americanisation of the political arena

Anglo-Saxon countries, however – in particular the USA – customarily adopt a different attitude to taxation and benefits. Here, people feel the state has very little entitlement to pass on to others property that its citizens have acquired through the sweat of their own brow. Social benefits paid out by government are correspondingly minimal and individuals keen to receive more are obliged to fund their own insurance. People incapable of doing so or who make insufficient effort to find low-paid work are struck off the list of benefit recipients and have no other choice but to turn to church-run soup kitchens and charity organisations.

As a result of the self-induced obstruction of policymaking that has gone on for some two decades in a number of European countries, debate in the public domain on the funding of the welfare state has degenerated into ideological feuding between political camps with party leaders no longer involved in electioneering on the basis of logical reasoning but American-style mood-adjusted PR-razzamatazz.

In reality, they find themselves increasingly at the mercy of economic constraints whose wider contexts they are either no longer capable of explaining, or willing to elucidate, to their electorates for fear of the truth and its implications.

2. The political ramifications of global modernity

2.1 The nation-state's lost capacity of political control

A national welfare state – as already stated in 1.3 – relies on the productive capacity of an economy geared to fulfilling market requirements. When however the economic operators increasingly employ their multinational organisations to cut the amount of tax they are meant to pay or to engineer fixed pricing – take oil as a good example – there then arise for the elected parliaments unelected secondary governments without democratic mandate. Ministers of the Treasury and Ministers of Economic Affairs appear emasculated in certain situations and are obliged to announce their proposals with the proviso that their financial calculations depend on global parameters evolving favourably. They have no direct influence on these – or only to a limited extent.

There are also political spheres in which elected representatives of the nation-states grant approval to developments whose actual outcomes are unintended and which they are later unable to control within the scope of national policies. This has occurred and continues to do so at transnational levels of the European Union or through international treaties, e.g. within the framework of the WTO (World Trade Organisation) or climate protection agreements (Kyoto Protocol).

2.2 Token politics and negative integration

For several decades now nationally elected politicians have been increasingly forced to deal with the repercussions of political decisions they made years earlier. They considered these decisions to be good in principle at the time and, if they have integrity, they continue to do so at present. Faced by difficulties that have arisen in certain areas of the economy, some have however taken retreat behind walls of national interest to escape the grievances of the electorate.

The start of the BSE crisis serves as a good example. British farmers had at first responded positively to the new market opportunities for the sale of beef in the EU and increased their production, to their disservice however also with the use of contaminated feed. When the BSE epidemic broke out, the other EU countries banned the import of British beef, which caused an outcry among British politicians – for who among them in rural constituencies ever stood a chance of re-election if they had opined that the blame for the import ban lay not with the EU but with the farmers themselves and the low standards of quality control in their own country?

Token politics are a form of politics intent not on securing proper knowledge of the true interests and wider contexts involved but a form that is quick to deal in populist recriminations and the finding of **scapegoats**.

Another illustration:

When Commissioner Bolkestein, in charge of EU single market affairs, put forward the so-called Services Directive in 2004, it was initially welcomed by economists, with Germany's Minister for Economic Affairs, Clement, claiming that a free service market would provide a clear impetus for growth. Considered in terms of the EU as a whole, this was undoubtedly true. However, when it emerged in the course of 2005 that it would primarily be the new EU member states in Eastern Europe who would benefit from the opening up of service markets, more, for instance, than the high-wage countries Germany and France, the EU Commission was accused of encouraging wage dumping and social dumping – the **scapegoat** had been found. The truth is that the German government, for example, is reluctant to introduce a minimum wage to eradicate dumping wages already in existence in some employment sectors, or to work towards a fair European solution to the wage issue that would run counter to the interests of certain economic enterprises and individual national governments.

That is however very difficult to achieve at EU level, considering after all that the decision-making process involves 25 European governments. And as a rule, agreement is reached – because there is no solidarity – only on the lowest common denominator. This is then regarded by many ordinary citizens as **negative integration** if the results prove to be no more than the “revocation of national political controls for the sake of free market processes”. (LANGE, 2002, p. 126) Approval ratings for the European Union are only positive when welfare standards also improve for many and should disadvantages creep in, alternatives redress the balance in their place. However, when voters have no proportional influence in the European Parliament that matches their numeric distribution and Commission proposals by and large continue to be decided on by national representatives in the Council of Ministers – in closed sessions –, it comes as no surprise that national politicians find no difficulty chalking up benefits as the result of their own efforts and handicaps as the fault of the EU. Public debate about common European welfare standards and identity-instilling reciprocal values urgently needs to be conducted in the next few years, also in respect of the generation of wide approval for a European Constitution. (Tp 202/5)

2.3 Frontline and backstage politics

It is unfortunate that the public portrayal of political dealings, both within European nation-states and between them, frequently fails to correlate with the political aims actually pursued behind the scenes.

The government heads of Germany's left-wing *Länder* (States) thus indicated their intention to rescue the welfare state, insisting that its dismantling at the hands of the right-wing dominated Federal government would never be tolerated. In reality, all that mattered was gaining power at the next election. Hardly had this been achieved when the policies of the rejected government were resumed, in part even contrary to the party's own interests.

Or yet another example:

In Germany the red-green coalition government's plans to implement a contemporary Migration Act were vigorously opposed by the Christian Democrats on the grounds that the integrity of the country's 'Germanness' was in danger of being diluted through intolerable numbers of foreign nationals living in Germany. In reality, the Christian Democrats were hoping to gain additional votes from the fear of excessive immigration, for no sooner had they begun to participate in governing the country than CDU Chancellor Merkel made the integration of foreign nationals into a focal point of her policymaking.

At EU levels, examples of the discrepancy between ostensible argumentation and real intent can also be found.

During the European leaders' EU Summit in June 2005, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair insisted he was only prepared to consider a reduction in the so-called British rebate if France in return would relinquish a portion of its farming subsidy. Negotiations on EU fiscal planning till 2013 broke down over this issue, the EU preferring – as Blair put it – to invest in cows rather than children and in farmers rather than education.

During the subsequent British EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2005, however, contrary to all expectation the British government centred its efforts – not on reducing the EU budget expenditure on farming – but on maintaining the British rebate in full. Additional funding for education and research – which Blair also considered essential – was now no longer to be obtained through savings on farming but through reduced spending on regional development in the new EU states in East Central Europe. (Tp 202/6, Tp 202/7)

These countries had already been disadvantaged at the European Council Meeting in Nice (December 2000) by a method known as “**package dealing**”.

Spain's Prime Minister Aznar staunchly championed the complete opening of work markets within Europe, although Spain had for years experienced virtually no emigration of labour. The German government on the other hand feared massive tides of immigrant labour from East Central Europe, in particular from Poland, as a result of the eastward enlargement of the EU and demanded lengthy transitional periods. This ran completely counter to the interests of the Polish government, which welcomed the Spanish backup. With collapse of the Meeting virtually imminent, Aznar proposed acceptance of the transitional periods that Germany was asking for, if the Germans in return would advocate that Spain retain full continued status in respect of its receipts from the Cohesion Fund from 2007. On this basis, agreement was reached, yet at a price entailing reduced funding in the coming years for improvements to infrastructure and environmental protection in the new EU states of East Central Europe. Spain only made use of its voting weight (in this instance a veto), risked nothing, and Poland, the largest new EU member state, was left empty-handed.

The achievement of political goals using shammed reasoning may well be applauded here and there; collectively however such events do untold harm to the reputation of the political elite in every instance whether the sphere of action of those concerned is at regional, national or European level.

2.4 The nation-state and societal integration

The nation-state in the classical sense of a container (container theory) for a people (nation) with regulatory competence orientated towards the common weal is caught in a dilemma. As an entity within a transnational (European) and global system, it is at present unable to resolve three issues:

- The integration of immigrants, whether from East Central or South Eastern Europe, for lack of financial means or for fear of “*Überfremdung*” (“alien-induced dilution of national identity”).
- The setting up of a regulatory frame for the creation of fair socio-economic conditions of living, at least within Europe, for lack of correlation among the relevant values and norms, since pan-European solidarity can only come about on the basis of a European identity, which is nowhere within sight.
- The curbing of harmful excesses of globalisation, for lack of political and economic clout.

3. The ramifications of national, European and global parameters for German society

In Germany the parameters described above have resulted in crisis-laden conditions of epic proportions. (Gp 202/2)

3.1 Structural crisis

In response to the impact of rationalisation, technologisation and globalisation, unemployment figures in Germany have for years swung between 4 and 5 million. Expressed as an average percentage, this corresponds to some 9 to 11 per cent of the labour market, and in certain areas of Eastern Germany rates above 20 per cent are not unknown.

If it is assumed that satisfactory integration into society is in the main contingent upon whether people have access to education and work, it may be concluded that a sense of disintegration is increasingly making itself felt in German society. (Tp 202/8)

Job loss in many cases has absolutely nothing to do with personal shortcomings, but is frequently brought about through the relocation of production abroad or through the demise of a host of industries due to their lack of efficiency.

Often there is an unavailability of swift replacement for the lost job and after a year of unemployment, people who have spent their entire lives in employment find themselves financially on an equal footing with those who have always primarily supported themselves through social benefits.

Against such a backdrop, anxieties about reductions in standards of living, feelings of impotence or indifference arise, or alternatively, depending on predisposition, people's potential for conflict and violence finds release. (Tp 202/9; HEITMEYER, 1997, p. 634)

3.2 Regulatory crisis

Depth of social integration is proportional to the number of common values and standards shared. Societal development however bears two mutually exclusive tendencies. On the one hand, pluralisation of values and standards creates a potential basis for social diversity; simultaneously however, under the combined pressures of safeguarding a livelihood and fears of status loss, it brings about a lessened sense of purpose and rapport when competition imposes a necessity to maintain distance from others.

“Arbitrariness also undermines value and norm structures because the effects of our individual behaviour on others need no longer be taken into particular account.” (HEITMEYER, 1997, p. 635) If the core of undisputed norms is smaller than that of the controversial, there is a loss in the validity of all values and norms, i.e. there is a decreased readiness to comply with the non-contentious. Pluralisation, along with gains in freedom, may have a destabilising effect on norm structure, especially at times when structural crises proliferate.

3.3 Crisis of allegiance

When in alignment with economic exclusion (structural crisis) and reduced social contacts the additional impression emerges in society that interpersonal rules of conduct are beginning to totter (regulatory crisis), doubts soon arise as to the durability of the cornerstones of guaranteed state provision.

“In contrast to Anglo-Saxon cultural zones, for example, justification and support for political systems in continental Europe depend to a large extent on quantifiable material output from welfare policy arrangements for the population. Acceptance of democracy takes its orientation, and especially in Germany, from the aggregate of welfare state security, provident and transfer benefits.” (LANGE, 2000, p. 115)

When, for example, doubts arise regarding politically expressed commitment in respect of involuntary, blameless unemployment, sickness or pension fundability, a loss of legitimacy for the policymakers responsible may ensue, with citizens withdrawing their allegiance from them, or indeed from the entire democratic system. Widespread weariness with politics, reduced turnouts at elections and the election of extremist parties are indications of silent or open protest.

Crises of allegiance and regulatory crises are interrelated, with some 57% of Germans in 2002 bemoaning their impotence in the face of developments or implemented policies, and as many as 66% expressing the same view in 2005. Here are signs of a clearly widespread sense of lost direction and of a lack of certainty about what values and objectives should be accorded priority, including the means for bringing these about. (MANSEL et al, 2006, p. 44)

3.4 Crisis of cohesion

In the highly industrialised states of Europe, lucrative job opportunities posted on the labour market increasingly hinge on demands for great flexibility and mobility; indeed, in certain areas people are even prepared to travel more than 100 kilometres a day in order to find any employment at all. Many professionals are only able to return to their homes at weekends, some only at even greater intervals.

“In order to obtain a flexible potential utilisation of opportunity, our premise runs, a mind-set asserts itself whereby stable, dependable, close relationships and associative attachments to others or groups or networks are more likely to be evaded or at any rate undergo a benefit-cost analysis. There is hence an increased risk of instability entering social relations. This manifests itself among others in the rise in divorce rates.” (MANSEL et al, 2006, 41f)

However, it is not only on family life that the demands of work take their toll; many people also struggle to maintain contact with friends or to remain involved with clubs, associations or social networks. Around 40% of the German population expressed the view between 2002 and 2005 that it was becoming increasingly difficult to find real friends. Particularly in lower income bands – with their frequency, too, of single mothers – a retreat from earlier social relations and networks can be observed. In extreme cases such breakdown can have dramatic repercussions extending all the way to unlawful killing, both among the native population and in families with immigrant backgrounds.

4. Links between the socio-economic transformation of Europe and immigration

Up until the early 1980s neither sociologists nor politicians attached any particular significance to the problems of integrating ethnic minorities in the industrialised nations of central Europe. Since the iron curtain fell and the first effects of global modernity described above made themselves felt, the complexity of relations between majority society and minorities has continually grown.

On the one hand, three disparate waves of immigration in western and central Europe should be recognised:

- I Migration from Mediterranean countries and Turkey till the mid-1970s
- II Migration from East Central and South East Europe since the 1990s, in part of an illegal nature, but within the EU since 2004 – with certain exceptions – increasingly awarded legal status
- III For a number of recent years a rising tide of illegal immigration from non-EU countries, i.e. eastern Europe, the Near East and Africa.

On the other hand, a differentiation must be made between:

- a) economic motives and the success rates and/or prospects of success among the immigrants
- b) degree of cultural divergence from the majority society and
- c) opportunities for obtaining welfare benefit safeguards within the particular majority society.

Against the backdrop of the crises so far depicted and which the majority of European countries find themselves more or less hard pushed to cope with, assessment can be made of what potential for conflict will readily form when, in respect of Immigrant Groups I, II or III, a connectedness is presumed to exist between these and

- a) economic competition (low wages)
- b) the erosion of value and norm systems (pluralism) and/or
- c) so-called “social sponging”.

Perceptions of the migration phenomenon vary of course from EU-country to country. What is judged a threat by sectors of the population in one is considered in another an opportunity for profit maximisation or a necessary demographic counterweight; in yet others it is welcomed as a fortuitous occasion to modernise the nation’s social fabric. (Further details relating to immigration issues are to be found in the material provided by Ute ACKERMANN-BOEROS on COMCULT Theme 2, Factual Approach)

With regard to the situation in Germany, the following deals primarily with the problems relating to Immigrant Group I and within this group, particularly Turkish immigrants, who at around 2 million individuals comprise the major share.

4.1 The structural crisis and its impact on relations between majority and minority society

In section 3.1 it has already been indicated that the progressive decoupling of capital and work – i.e. growth without the creation of new jobs – results in social breakdown within the majority society. This state of affairs has a particularly severe impact on many immigrants and their families as they are, in cases of poor command of the language and a lack of skills or qualifications, forced to take on work in the low-wage sector, frequently sign below-tariff rate employment contracts, or become totally dependent on unemployment benefits and other welfare payments.

Owing to the worsening structural crisis, the potential for conflict between members of the majority society threatened by loss of social status and certain immigrant groups has reached such a pitch in the past few years that members of the latter have been subjected to discriminatory haranguing and physical assault, which has not always been taken lying down however (e.g. youths at schools in Berlin).

... “When individuals perceive their own status as endangered and choose to blame specific groups in society for the situation, there is a tendency for these people to deprecate these very groups. In this variant there is therefore a correlation between social conditions – assessment of crises – deprecation of vulnerable groups. The connection between social circumstances and the extent of deprecation levelled at particular groups is thus brought about via the perception of crises. ...” (MANSEL et al, 2006, S. 45)

Such deprecating tendencies have long been widespread in German society, including its middle and upper echelons. “Xenophobia in the sense that ‘Germans need to ward off all the foreigners in their native country’ soared, for example, within a single year, i.e. between the spring of 2005 and the following spring, from 25.5% to 40.9%.” (HEITMEYER, 1997, p. 651)

4.2 The regulatory crisis – its specific ramifications for immigrants

Examples abound of Turkish immigrants with corresponding educational status, either from their native country or acquired in Germany, who experience life as an additional enrichment when lived in an environment that partially espouses different values.

The majority of Turkish immigrants, however, originally come from rural areas of Turkey with, in part, limited access to schooling. For this group the structural crisis represents a particularly severe exacerbation of what from the outset was a difficult situation. A lack of finances, the absence of recognition within the wider community and subjection to accusations of “social sponging” when unemployed – these all constitute

a straight route into ethnic self-isolation in which the only sure orientation is obtained through adherence to traditional patriarchal notions of social order.

The younger generation growing up under such circumstances have a doubly hard furrow to plough. Within the family they are constantly aware of the contradiction between parental demands for the children's honour and respect and the parents' inability to gain these dues from society at large. Retention of this conflict between aspiration and means of realisation in their own lives inevitably results in inferiority complexes; these call for compensatory traits, whether in the form of a huge potential for violence or contempt for the supposedly amoral majority society, as a basis for a sense of superiority, at least from a moral or cultural standpoint.

Such patterns of behaviour take on politically dangerous dimensions when within certain groups they find themselves clad in organisational armour.

4.3 The crisis of allegiance – and even unto the third generation

Allegiance to a nation-state is contingent upon levels of identification with the values its population holds and upon what the nation-state provides for its citizens. Yet how are immigrants possibly to identify easily with a society that has withheld recognition from them for decades? Then again, the 2006 World Cup clearly indicated where the sympathies of the Turkish supporters lay (with or without a German passport). It was only because the Turkish team could not take part in the games that the Turkish immigrants waved the (substitute) German flag.

This behaviour reveals the grievous errors that have taken place in endeavours at integration on both sides and which are however coming to a dramatic head among many of the young – particularly in this, the third immigrant generation. Although many of the children born to immigrants in Germany have German citizenship and are consequently on an equal legal footing with the rest of the majority society, this counts for little when they are raised by mothers who cannot speak German. The children's and juveniles' command of the language is then so poor that these individuals suffer disadvantages at school. And if the educational system is not or cannot be made use of to climb the social ladder, career opportunities also tend towards nil. Moreover, returning to Turkey can hardly be considered a real option for this third generation as these individuals' poor command of the Turkish language precludes this possibility. Apart from this, these young people exhibit manners of behaviour that immediately earn them the nickname '*Deutschländer*' (Jerryturks) in Turkey, which shows that here too they would be in a new minority.

The question of allegiance in the first and second immigrant generation hardly needs posing. The myriad satellite dishes bristling from tenement buildings and houses inhabited by Turks and the galaxy of Turkish newspapers on display in German newspaper stands give an indication of the large numbers of Turkish immigrants who find themselves in Germany in physical and economic name only, while their hearts and souls remain in the Turkey that is their cultural homeland.

The rules according to which this parallel society operates have so far only come to the attention of Germans through a number of shocking crimes that hit the headlines. Nevertheless, publicly expressed concern is on the rise in the light of the all-embracing structural crisis. Fears of lost status and the distributional tussle for dwindling reserves in the welfare coffers also heighten awareness of immigrant groups, and add to the need for their adaptability.

4.4 The crisis of cohesion – for immigrants the experience partially differs

While social coherence in the majority society enters ever deeper eclipse, the exact opposite can be observed in the case of many immigrants. Family and national ties are strengthened through a voluntary segregation from majority society and turned into impregnable cultural bastions from which escape is a virtual impossibility for young people, circumstances which at times take devastatingly dramatic turns.

Forced marriages and honour killings are symptomatic of methods of family organisation which contravene basic general human rights. Equally unacceptable is the exploitation of religion by so-called preachers of hatred who aim to undermine each and every basis for peaceful coexistence through segregation.

An even greater danger is presented by cohesion of the exclusively inward-turning variety when the members of the group involved are coerced into conformity. This occurs equally in the case of right-wing extremists and immigrants with a proclivity for violence. For both these groups, national or religious cohesion becomes the final refuge from the inexorable laws of structural crisis and the progressive fragmentation of society.

Concluding reflection

Migratory Wave I was set in motion by economically burgeoning nation-states of western and central Europe and has today found its sequel in the shape of Migration II within the European Union. On the perimeter of the EU, globalisation now impels thousands annually to vie for entry. That is to say, in the past 50 years every single parameter has been reset:

- The economy has ceased to operate nationally; instead it is globally active, anticipating more rapid growth and higher yields outside Europe.
- National governments are obliged to share their regulatory competence with global and European institutions.
- The direction of flow, dimensions and ethnic composition of the migratory tides have also changed.

What does social integration need to achieve? What is it capable of achieving? And at what level? - If fundamental values of social existence are allowed to fall by the wayside, it will be a struggle to find satisfactory answers.

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